in TRUTH 47 



consistency is a mark of truth, and that when we find 

 that we can maintain our conceptual interpretations of 

 our experiences we come to treat them as realities. But 

 to take the pronouncement that truth is what Jits in a 

 system as therefore final would be ludicrously rash, and 

 to detect the limitations of the formula, it suffices to 

 consider what may be said in favour of a string of 

 counter-propositions, such as, e.g. (i) that not all systems 

 are true, (2) that no system is true, (3) that many 

 systems are true, and (4) that even if all truth be 

 systematic, it is not thereby adequately defined. 



(1) To define truth as systematic is at once to raise 

 the question of systematic falsehood. For there can be 

 no doubt that false assumptions also tend to complete 

 themselves in a system of inferences, to cohere together, 

 to assimilate fresh facts, and to interpret them into con 

 formity with themselves; in short, to assume all the logical 

 features that are claimed for truth. Does it not follow, 

 therefore, that something more than systematic coherence 

 is needed to determine truth ? As, therefore, not all 

 systems are true, must we not suggest a further criterion 

 to distinguish true from false ? 



The reply to this objection would have to take the 

 form largely of an acceptance thereof. It would have to 

 be admitted that in proportion as a falsehood or a lie 

 became more systematic, its prospects of being accepted 

 as true grew greater, that coherent lies did often win 

 acceptance, and that a perfectly coherent lie (or error) 

 would be tantamount to absolute truth. Lies can be 

 called false only when they have been found out, and they 

 are found out just because sooner or later they do not 

 fit into our system of truth. These systematic falsehoods 

 are never quite systematic enough, and so the mimicry of 

 truth by false systems, so far from subverting, rather con 

 firms the doctrine that truth is systematic. 



(2) This defence prepares the way for a new assault. 

 It would be adequate if we really had an indefeasible 

 system of absolute truth by whose aid we might detect 

 the inconsistencies of the pseudo- systems. But where 



