iv LOTZE S MONISM 77 



the Deity. But what has all this to do with the Unity of 

 Things? Such arguments are quite independent of his 

 metaphysical monism, and are not brought into any logical 

 connexion with it merely by calling the Unity of Things 

 God. It would have been far more to the purpose to 

 show how the Unity of Things could be personal and 

 moral. 



I would contend, then, that just as the hypostasisation 

 of the Unity of Things was unnecessary in the Metaphysics, 

 so its deification is unnecessary in the Philosophy of 

 Religion, Not even for monotheistic religions is there 

 any necessary transition from the assertion of one Absolute 

 to that of one God. For the unity of the Godhead in 

 monotheism is primarily directed against the disorders of 

 polytheism, and intended to safeguard the unity of plan 

 and operation in the Divine governance of the world ; it 

 cannot be equated with the unity of the Absolute, unless 

 the conceptions of plan and guidance are applicable to 

 the latter. But this is just what we have seen they are 

 not : the Absolute could have no plan and could guide 

 nothing ; its unity therefore has no religious value. 



The reason, then, for this hiatus in Lotze s argumenta 

 tion is simply this, that an Absolute is not a God and 

 that none of the Divine attributes can be extracted from 

 it. Hence Lotze must perforce derive them from con 

 siderations of a different kind. 



V. In the sequel, moreover, this derivation of the Deity 

 from the metaphysical unity of things is for the most part 

 ignored, and the interesting discussions in which Lotze 

 elucidates the nature of the fundamental religious concep 

 tions presuppose nothing but the traditional conceptions 

 and historically given problems of religious philosophy. 

 Throughout the whole of this most valuable part of Lotze s 

 book ( 21-70) I cannot find that he expresses any 

 opinion rendered logically necessary by his doctrine of 

 the Absolute, while there seem to be several, e.g., the 

 defence of Free Will, which accord with it but badly. As 

 already stated, Lotze cannot dispense with this conception 

 in order to uphold the conception of a Divine governance, 



