106 HUMANISM vi 



reality of the Time-process. On the contrary, if the tran 

 sition from means to end were instantaneous, the distinc 

 tion between them would vanish, and lose all meaning. 

 Still less has it been found repugnant either to the reason 

 or to the feelings of men to regard the Time-process as 

 the realisation of an end or even of a multitude of indi 

 vidual ends, e.g. as a process of spiritual redemption. 

 There is, therefore, perfect harmony between an ethical 

 metaphysic and the existence of individuals in Time and 

 Space, while that existence is found to be irreconcilable 

 with any abstract metaphysical formula. 



We must conclude, then, that the method of explaining 

 the ultimate nature of the world by an abstract universal 

 formula, or a series of such, is not supported by the 

 methodological use of similar formulas in the natural 

 sciences, which, rightly considered, leads to very different 

 inferences. What compensation then has it to offer us 

 for its inability to take account of many of the chief data 

 which a comprehensive philosophy has to explain ? Surely 

 the full reality which has to be explained is the individual 

 in the Time-process. And though it will remain no trivial 

 task to exhibit the rationality of the Real, it has yet 

 become evident that rationality is but one of several attri 

 butes to be predicated of Reality, and that a mere ration 

 alism or panlogism, therefore, can never be anything but 

 a one-sided philosophy. 



We have to consider next the second question raised 

 (on p. 99) as to whether by pursuing a different method 

 philosophy is able to recognise the reality of the Time- 

 process. And if such philosophic recognition is possible, 

 what is the metaphysical value and methodological bearing 

 of the reality of Time (or rather of the Time-process) ? 

 Or is there possibly, as Dr. McTaggart suggests (loc. cit. 

 p. 1 66), &quot;something about Time which renders it unfit, 

 in metaphysics, for the ultimate explanation of the 

 universe&quot;? The prejudice to this effect is no doubt well- 

 founded from the standpoint of a philosophy whose initial 

 abstraction excludes Time. But if we decline to hamper 

 ourselves by a method which fails de facto to account for 



