vi METAPHYSICS OF TIME-PROCESS 107 



Time and imperfection, while its claim de jure had to be 

 disallowed as ignoring the supreme practical limitations 

 under which the whole understanding operates, the case is 

 different. It has already been shown that an ethical 

 metaphysic has no difficulty in conceiving the ultimate 

 end as realisable in the Time-process. And indeed from 

 such a standpoint it is possible to indicate an explanation 

 even of the Becoming which is so puzzling a characteristic 

 of the Real, and the source of all our conceptions of Time 

 and Change it may be ascribed to the struggle of finite 

 existence to attain that ultimate end. Instead of being 

 left over as an inexplicable surd at the conclusion of a 

 metaphysical explanation, the Time-process thus becomes 

 an integral part of that explanation, and a fruitful source 

 of inquiry opens out to philosophy concerning its value in 

 the discovery and estimation of ultimate truth. It would 

 be impossible within the limits of this essay to attempt 

 any detailed account of the metaphysical conclusions to 

 which the admission of the reality of the Time-process 

 would lead. Suffice it to say that I am convinced that 

 the system we should arrive at would prove no less 

 coherent and complete than any of the great systems of 

 abstract metaphysics, and that the difficulties which it 

 may at first sight seem to involve are due to an (incon 

 sistent) reversion to the methods of abstract metaphysics. 

 There are, however, two points which it seems necessary 

 to emphasise. The first is that a metaphysic of the Time- 

 process will stand in the same relation to the explanation 

 of phenomena by their history, as a metaphysic of abstract 

 ideas stands to their explanation by universal laws, i.e. 

 the Historical Method will represent the application in 

 science of the metaphysical principle. But while to an 

 abstract metaphysic the Historical Method must ultimately 

 be foolishness, a metaphysic of the Time -process will 

 justify that method by expressing it in a metaphysical, i.e. 

 final, form. And this alone would suffice to prove its 

 superiority ; for nowadays we can as little dispense with 

 the explanation of things by their history as with their 

 explanation by universal laws. A philosophy, then, 



