vii REALITY AND IDEALISM 1 in 



with Mr. Ritchie s, and as, moreover, they are not stated 

 or definitely referred to, the total effect is somewhat 

 confusing. Nor is the confusion improved by the way 

 in which Mr. Ritchie discusses some two or three different 

 questions about reality in the same breath. The justifica 

 tion in his mind for this procedure evidently lies in the 

 fact that they all offer a basis for objections to his own 

 views, which he would, perhaps, not object to have called 

 Neo-Hegelian. But this does not constitute any intrinsic 

 kinship between the views he criticises, and his discussion 

 would have gained largely if he had added to his 

 classification of the various sorts of reality a classification 

 of the various questions that may be raised about it. It 

 would be too much, perhaps, to expect Mr. Ritchie to 

 excel the rest of his school as much in substance as he 

 does in style, but it seems evident that he has, as little 

 as they, kept clear of the Hegelian confusion of epistem- 

 ology and metaphysics, to which Professor Seth l has of late 

 drawn so much attention. 



There are at least four questions, which Mr. Ritchie s 

 paper trenches upon. They are 



I. How do we know that there is any reality at all, or 

 how do we come to assert an external world ? 



II. What is reality at the beginning of inquiry, i.e. 

 what is the primary datum to be explained ? 



III. How is it to be explained by what criteria do 

 we inquire into reality ? 



IV. What does reality turn out to be after inquiry ? 

 Of these, I. and III. seem to be epistemological, while 



II. is psychological, and IV. plainly metaphysical. Mr. 

 Ritchie does not seem to distinguish II. from III., 

 attributes his answer to III. without more ado to IV., and 

 refers to I. only at the end, by way of meeting a logical 

 objection to his view of IV. This confusion is shown also 

 in his method of proof. His real purpose is to establish 

 certain metaphysical views as to the nature of ultimate 

 reality, but he treats his subject for the most part as 

 if it were an epistemological inquiry into the criteria 



1 Now Professor Pringle Pattison. 



