vn REALITY AND IDEALISM 121 



the atoms similarly. But would he seriously contend that 

 he can already give an entirely consistent, coherent, and 

 intelligible view of the whole world, giving a reason why 

 everything is exactly what it is and not otherwise? Of 

 course Mr. Ritchie does not lay claim to such omniscience. 

 But if he cannot, in what respect is he better than those 

 publicans and sinners, the plain men and the realists ? 

 If he cannot, why make such a fuss about formal coherency 

 and consistency as the test of reality? By his own 

 admission they represent a postulate which is never 

 actually realised, and for aught we know never can be. 

 If he cannot, lastly, what boots it to explain that though 

 reality is not thought for us, it is for God ? l This free 

 and easy appeal to the Deity, in the midst of a discussion 

 of human knowledge, in order to silence an opponent and 

 to fill up any gap in the argument, ought surely to be as 

 severely reprobated as the mediaeval practice of ascribing 

 any ill-understood fact or bit of knowledge to the agency 

 of the Devil. The question is not whether to a divine 

 mind, supposing its existence to be tenable in Mr. Ritchie s 

 sense, Reality is Thought, but whether that assertion is a 

 valid defence against the objection that Mr. Ritchie has 

 given away his case when he has admitted that reality is 

 not thought to human minds. Until, then, Mr. Ritchie 

 can bring rather more convincing proof of his approaching 

 apotheosis and omniscience, it must be contended that he 

 has neither made out his assertion that rationality is the 

 test of reality, nor its connexion with the metaphysical 

 dogma that the real is ultimately the thought of a 

 divine mind. 



This question as to the ultimate nature of reality, 

 forming the ultimate problem of ontology, brings us to 

 the fourth and last question which may be raised about 

 reality. And enough has been said concerning the 

 imperfections of our methods of interpreting reality, to 

 render it clear that we are perhaps hardly yet entitled to 

 give any very confident answer to this question. From 

 a purely scientific standpoint, I can see no reason for 



1 Darwin and Hegel, p. 88. 



