150 HUMANISM 



VIII 



one direction will not be more than an infinitesimal portion 

 of the whole. It is not necessary, therefore, to adduce 

 any special cause for those particular variations ; they 

 need not be regarded as due to anything more than 

 chance, that is, to causes which do not in any intelligent 

 way discriminate in their favour. That advantageous 

 variations should occasionally occur is no more remark 

 able, or in need of explanation, than that by throwing 

 dice long enough we should occasionally throw sixes. 

 If, then, indefinite variation be an actual fact, no special 

 intelligence need be assumed to account even for the 

 most abnormal variation. In other words, a principle has 

 been adopted which rules out tlie hypotJiesis of intelligent 

 direction a priori, if we forget or fail to perceive that 

 indefinite variation is a methodological assumption. And 

 being a priori, the principle would rule out the hypothesis 

 whatsoever the facts were, and however much they might 

 suggest the action of intelligence. Intelligence is non 

 suited by the way in which the question is put, and 

 irrespective of the facts of the case. 



Yet all this is due to nothing more mysterious than 

 an application of the calculus of probabilities, for, as all 

 who are even slightly familiar with that calculus are 

 aware, even the most improbable result may be expected 

 to occur if a sufficiency of cases be given. It is highly 

 improbable, for example, that any one should, by fair 

 dealing, acquire a hand containing thirteen trumps at 

 whist. But if he had played some 640,000,000,000 

 hands, he might fairly expect to hold all the trumps on 

 one occasion. Everything that happens may be due to 

 chance, and no matter how improbabilities are multiplied, 

 we never altogether eliminate the infinitesimal probability 

 that everything is due to chance. Supposing we were 

 to try to persuade an obstinate materialist that our 

 conduct was dictated by a purpose and due to intelligence, 

 and was not the action of an automatic mechanism which 

 had by some strange chance put on a delusive appearance 

 of purposiveness. However intelligently we acted, we 

 could not convince our adversary, if he were permitted 



