160 HUMANISM 



IX 



hedonistic disputes, we may proceed to determine its 

 deepest nature. That nature would seem to consist in 

 the denial of the value of life, in whatever terms and by 

 whatever standards it may be formulated. If Pessimism 

 springs from the experience of pain, it will deny the value 

 of life because happiness is unattainable ; if from moral 

 indignation, because goodness is unattainable ; if from 

 aesthetic disgust, because beauty is unattainable ; if from 

 scepticism, because knowledge is unattainable. But in 

 each case the value of life will be denied. It makes no 

 difference to Pessimism whether a man despair because 

 the world is so miserable, or so bad, or so hideous, or so 

 inscrutable. 



It follows from this that Pessimism is essentially a 

 certain definite attitude towards the great and well- 

 recognised class of judgments which are known as judg 

 ments of Value (Werturteile}. Now, judgments of Value 

 are possible about everything that is experienced, and are 

 usually contrasted with judgments of Fact in that they do 

 not inquire what a thing is, but what it is worth. And, 

 like the primary judgments of Fact, alike whether they are 

 ethical, aesthetical, or merely emotional or affective, they 

 are primarily relative, i.e. they assert that something has 

 value for this purpose or that, for this aspect or that, of 

 human nature. But just as the logical judgments must 

 ultimately be accommodated in a coherent system of Truth, 

 so the judgments of Value must ultimately all be referred 

 to some supremely valuable end of action, or Summuni 

 Bonum. It will be possible then to estimate life as a 

 Whole by this supreme standard of Value, and to discuss 

 whether it satisfies it or not. If, as the outcome of such 

 discussion, it shall appear that no coherent system can 

 be framed, and that our valuations fail, their failure 

 will create the situation on which Pessimism forms the 

 emotional reaction. 



Now as the result of such discussion, only three alter 

 natives seem thinkable : 



I. We may conclude that Life is adequate to the 

 attainment of the supreme end of action, and that, 



