ix PESSIMISM IN PHILOSOPHY 163 



And, moreover, the attempt to draw such a distinction 

 would seem to break down even on the theoretic side. 

 Granted that our theoretical account of the world had 

 denied to all the judgments of Value, except those 

 which use the predicates of true and false/ all 

 ultimate significance, yet the fact would remain that 

 such judgments were made and formed an integral part 

 of life. They would remain, therefore, as an inexplicable 

 factor in the world. And the more we realised the 

 importance of this factor and the manner in which it 

 permeates all our activities and directs even the intellect 

 when it is seeking to deny it, the more doubtful should 

 we become whether we had explained anything while 

 this was left inexplicable. That is, we should inevitably 

 be impelled towards scepticism on the theoretic side, and 

 the practical reflex of scepticism is, as I have elsewhere 

 shown, nothing else than Pessimism. 1 



It remains to ask whether the problems of Value or of 

 Fact are more ultimate, and whether ultimately the one 

 may not be subordinated to the other. I believe that 

 they may and must, and that the antithesis between 

 them is ultimately noxious because all values are facts and 

 all facts are values, i.e. the product of one or other of our 

 modes of valuation. 2 



But once more I can only very briefly indicate the 

 ground for this conclusion. I shall here confine myself 

 to observing that mere intellection is impotent (97 Sidvoia 

 avrrj ovOev /az&amp;gt;et), that the human mind is essentially 

 purposive, that in its activity the judgments and ideals 

 of Value supply the motive power to the judgments of 

 Fact, and that, in the absence of anything valuable to 

 be reached by them, no reason can be assigned why such 

 judgments should be made. Hence if judgments of Fact, 

 in spite of their illusory logical independence, seem 

 psychologically to be rendered possible by and rest on 



1 Riddles of the Sphinx, ch. iii. and iv. 



2 The issue raised by Pragmatism may also be stated as being whether logical 

 valuations alone shall be allowed to constitute facts, or whether this privilege 

 may not, under the proper conditions, be extended to the rest. And however the 

 question is decided, it is obvious that the conception of Truth needs further 

 scrutiny and can no longer be naively taken for granted. 



