182 HUMANISM x 



ing his own actions. It is here that the real difficulty lies. 

 If he were merely inert, he could, like man, be forced into 

 action. But be is active enough ; only he feels no 

 responsibility for his actions, which he regards as dis 

 passionately as the operations of natural forces. 



The only chance therefore would seem to be to get 

 him to take up his personal responsibility, to reverse the 

 policy which has driven him into his attitude of passive 

 and futile, but unanswerable, protest. He must no longer 

 be overruled in every action ; he must no longer feel 

 that 



Du darfst auch da nur frei erscheinen, 



that his spontaneous agency is mere illusion. Give him 

 real freedom to choose alternatives, real power to try his 

 hand at shaping a world that will realise his ideals, and 

 he may then convince himself, that it is better to help on 

 the Divine purpose than to thwart it. Whether he will or 

 not remains uncertain, as in the case of every one of us ; 

 but it is from this contingency alone that the real interest 

 and tragic significance of the cosmic drama spring. This 

 much at least seems clear, that a theodicy which strives 

 to oppress opposition by omnipotence must overreach 

 itself: sheer force can overcome Mephisto as little as 

 Prometheus. 



