XI 



ON PRESERVING APPEARANCES 1 



ARGUMENT 



Mr. F. H. Bradley s antithesis of Appearance and Reality as a catchword. 



II. His criterion of the non-contradiction of ultimate reality. But 

 ( I ) the criterion not ultimate, and used too recklessly. It is applied to 

 merely verbal difficulties. It is meaningless to call an unknowable 

 Absolute real, and this explains nothing about appearances. Nothing 

 even apparently real can be really contradictory. Non-contradiction is only 

 a special form of Harmony, and the rejection of contradiction is only a 

 form of the struggle towards satisfaction. Other modes of reaching 

 harmony. Harmony a postulate. (2) The criterion stultifies itself by 

 condemning everything, nor is it saved by the doctrine of Degrees. 



III. A valid doctrine of the relation of appearance to reality must 

 eschew the transcendence which renders Mr. Bradley s Absolute futile. 

 Necessity of retaining a grasp on reality throughout. The growth of 

 reality: (i) the reality of immediate experience our starting-point and 

 end. (2) Higher realities inferred to explain it, but remain secondary. 

 Their variety and relativity to purpose and need of a final synthesis in 

 (3) ultimate reality. IV. As to this five principles to be laid down (i) 

 Ultimate Reality must be made a real explanation. (2) Appearances 

 must be really preserved. (3) Primary reality of immediate experience 

 to be recognised. The reality even of dreams. The reality of the higher 

 world of Religion. How Idealism makes a difference. (4) The greater 

 efficiency of the higher reality. (5) Why Ultimate Reality must be 

 absolutely satisfactory. Because otherwise it would not be regarded as 

 ultimate. Why truth cannot be evil. If it were, its pursuit would 

 cease. Only complete satisfaction would bring finality of knowledge, 

 and that only if not merely conceived, but actually experienced. The 

 beatific vision as the ideal of knowledge. 



THE ambition of this paper is not, as might perhaps 

 wrongly be conjectured from a hasty perusal of its title, 



1 This essay appeared in Mind for July 1903 (N.S. No. 47). The chief 

 additions are in IV. (3), (4), and (5). The constructive problem it deals with 

 is that indicated at the end of Axioms as Postulates (Personal Idealism, p. 133). 



133 



