ip8 HUMANISM 



XI 



useless subtlety. And must we not as pragmatists 

 concede, that if it were really useless, it would incon- 

 testably be false ? * 



To be true at all, therefore, Idealism must make a 

 difference, but what shall we say it is ? It seems to 

 me that if Idealism is right in its fundamental conten 

 tion that existence is experience, and if we really try 

 to live up to this insight, the difference which it ought 

 to make is quite clearly this : that while the idealist does 

 not deny the relative reality of his actual experience, he 

 does not feel bound to commit himself in his inmost soul 

 to the assertion also of its absolute reality. That is, he 

 will make a certain inward reservation as to the ultimate 

 reality of an imperfect world ; he will hold himself free 

 to contemplate with a certain irony the brute facts of an 

 experience he cannot wholly master, free also to uphold 

 in their despite the ultimate validity of the ideals his 

 spirit craves ; in short, he will possess a reserve of 

 strength not open to his rivals, wherewith to meet the 

 buffetings of circumstance. Practically also he will be 

 more alert to seize upon whatever chances offer to effect 

 improvements in an actual order he does not hold to be 

 definitive : he will hold himself prepared to advance to 

 worlds of a higher and more harmonious order, 2 and to 

 welcome whatever indications of their possibility may 

 float within his ken. The vision of the realist, on the 

 other hand, conceiving himself to be cognisant of a final, 

 rigid, and independent reality, should be undeviatingly 

 fixed upon and bounded by the brute facts of his actual 

 experience : this he must regard as final, and he will thus 

 debar himself from all experiments that might extend its 

 borders or transform the context, and so the texture, of 

 his universe. As for the soi-disant idealists who can 

 draw no inference from their creed, we must contend that 

 they have really failed to grasp its essence, and are 

 unworthy of the name they have assumed. For the bow 

 of Odysseus belongs to him alone who can bend it, and, 

 if need be, use it upon the enemies of truth. 



1 Cp. pp. 38-40. - Cp. pp. 18, 22, 282. 



