xn ACTIVITY AND SUBSTANCE 217 



and to represent it as an unmeaning accident in a scheme 

 of things which when perfectly equilibrated would tran 

 scend it, or even to bind us Ixion-like on an unresting 

 wheel of change. 



For the facts are susceptible of a better interpretation. 

 May we not regard the flow of appearances as a defect, 

 not as a merit, of consciousness, engendered as an 

 adaptive response to the vicissitudes of a defective world ? 

 May not impermanence in consciousness (as elsewhere) 

 mark the Trovrjpia of a &amp;lt;j&amp;gt;v&amp;lt;ri&amp;lt;; impotent to function without 

 ceasing (cruz/e^co? evepyeiv) ? 



At all events it seems to be the case that (i) we strive 

 to prolong and retain pleasant states and objects of 

 consciousness ; (2) the fluttering of attention is protective, 

 and necessary to survival under conditions which render it 

 unsafe to become too much absorbed by the object of our 

 attention (or attentions), lest something to which we have 

 failed to attend should absorb us in a too literal sense ; 

 (3) even where practical exigencies do not compel us, we 

 have to shift the objects of our attention because they are 

 never found to be wJwlly satisfactory. May it not be 

 argued also that .the unsatisfactoriness is the cause of the 

 impermanence, and not vice versa ? But could we once 

 attain an object of contemplation which was wholly 

 satisfying, should we not seek to retain it in consciousness 

 for ever? If he had achieved the Best (TO aptarov}, could 

 any one be mad enough to wish to change it, for the worse ? 

 if he had passed the gates of heaven, could he lust again 

 for the impurities of earth ? 



Surely it follows, as Plato saw, from the very notion of 

 the Good that it must be a permanent possession ; it 

 follows also, as Aristotle saw, that if we are to be conscious 

 of it at all (and if not, how can it be a good ?), it must be 

 as an evepyeta aKivrjalas. I suspect, therefore, that the 

 objection to evepjeta itKiv^aias is at bottom one to the 

 whole notion of an attainable Good. But whether the 

 advocates of this objection are naively optimistic enough 

 to imagine that an unattainable ideal, recognised as suck, 

 continues to be an ideal a rational being can aim at, or 



