NEW SYSTEM OF PHILOSOPHY. XV 



general exposition of the doctrine and method elaborated by 

 science, and has applied to it a name which has obtained a certain 

 currency, is true. But it is not true that the holders of this doc 

 trine and followers of this method are disciples of M. Comte. 

 Neither their modes of inquiry nor their views concerning human 

 knowledge in its nature and limits are appreciably different from 

 what they were before. If they, are Poaitivists it is in the sense 

 that all men o science have been more or less consistently Posi- 

 tivists ; and the applicability of M. Comte s title to them no more 

 makes them his disciples than does its applicability to the men of 

 science who lived and died before M. Comte wrote, make them 

 his disciples. 



My own attitude toward M. Comte and his partial adherents 

 has been all along that of antagonism. In an essay on the 

 &quot; Genesis of Science,&quot; published in 1854, and republished with 

 other essays in 1857, 1 ha\e endeavoured to show that his theory 

 of the logical dependence and historical development of the 

 sciences is untrue. I have still among my papers the memoranda 

 of a second review (for which I failed to obtain a place), the pur 

 pose of which was to show the untenablencss of his theory of in 

 tellectual progress. The only doctrine of importance in which I 

 agree with him the relativity of all knowledge is one common to 

 him and sundry other thinkers of earlier date ; and even this I hold 

 in a different sense from that in which he held it. But on all 

 points that are distinctive of his philosophy, I differ from him. I 

 deny his Hierarchy of the Sciences. I regard his division of in 

 tellectual progress into the three phases, theological, metaphysi 

 cal, and positive, as superficial. I reject utterly his Religion of 

 Humanity. And his ideal of society I hold in detestation. Some 

 of his minor views I accept ; some of his incidental remarks seem 

 to me to be profound, but from everything which distinguishes 

 Comteism as a system, I dissent entirely. The only influence on 

 my own course of thought which I can trace to M. Comte s writings, 

 is the influence that results from meeting with antagonistic opin 

 ions definitely expressed. 



Such being my position, you will, I think, see that by classing 

 mo as a Positivist, and tacitly including me among the English 

 admirers and disciples of Comte, your reviewer unintentionally 

 misrepresents me. I am quite ready to bear the odium attaching 



