132 THE GENESIS OF 6CIEXCK. 



in essential conformity with the order which lias spontn 

 ncously taken place among the branches of natural philoso 

 jihy ; &quot; or, in other words corresponds with the order of 

 historic development. 



Let us compare these assertions with the facts. That 

 there may be perfect fairness, let us make no choice, hut 

 take as the field for our comparison, the succeeding section 

 treating of the first science Mathematics ; and let us use 

 none but M. Comte s own facts, and his own admissions. 

 Confining ourselves to this one science, of course our com 

 parisons must be between its several parts. M. Comte says, 

 that the parts of each science must be arranged in Un 

 order of their decreasing generality ; and that this older 

 of decreasing generality agrees with the order of historic 

 development. Our inquiry must be, then, whether the his 

 tory of mathematics confirms this statement. 



Carrying out his principle, M. Comte divides Mathe 

 matics into &quot; Abstract Mathematics, or the Calculus (tak 

 ing the word in its most extended sense) and Concrete 

 Mathematics, which is composed of General Geometry and 

 of Rational Mechanics. The subject-matter of the first of 

 these is number ; the subject-matter of the second includes 

 space, time, motion, force- The one possesses the highest 

 possible degree of generality ; for all things whatever 

 admit of enumeration. The others arc less general ; see 

 ing that there are endless phenomena that arc not cogniza 

 ble either by general geometry or rational mechanics. In 

 conformity with the alleged law, therefore, the evolution 

 of the calculus must throughout have preceded the evolu 

 tion of the concrete sub-sciences. Now somewhat awk 

 wardly for him, the first remark M. Comte makes bearing 

 upon this point is, that u from an historical point of view, 

 mathematical analysis appears to JHIVC risen out, o/ the con 

 templation of geometrical and mechanical facts. True, 

 he goes on to say that, &quot; it it: not the less independent of 



