INTELLIGENCE AND MORALS 55 



Whether the consequent revolution in moral philos 

 ophy be termed pragmatism or be given the hap 

 pier title of the applied and experimental habit of 

 mind is of little account. What is of moment is 

 that intelligence has descended from its lonely iso 

 lation at the remote edge of things, whence it 

 operated as unmoved mover and ultimate good, to 

 y take its seat in the moving affairs of men. Theory 

 may therefore become responsible to the practices 

 that have generated it; the good be connected 

 with nature, but with nature naturally, not meta 

 physically, conceived, and social life be cherished 

 in behalf of its own immediate possibilities, not on 

 the ground of its remote connections with a cosmic 

 reason and an absolute end. 



There is a notion, more familiar than correct, 

 that Greek thought sacrificed the individual to the 

 state. None has ever known better than the Greek 

 that the individual comes to himself and to his 

 own only in association with others. But Greek 

 thought subjected, as we have seen, both state and 

 individual to an external cosmic order ; and thereby 

 it inevitably restricted the free use in doubt, in 

 quiry, and experimentation, of the human intelli 

 gence. The anima libera, the free mind of the 

 sixteenth century, of Galileo and his successors, 

 was the counterpart of the disintegration of cos 

 mology and its animistic teleology. The lecturer 

 on political economy reminded us that his subject 



