INTELLIGENCE AND MORALS 73 



That this device of shorthand symbolization pres 

 ages the subjection of man s intelligent effort to 

 fixity of law and environment is interesting as a 

 culture survival, but is not important for moral 

 theory. Savage and child delight in creating 

 bogeys from which, their origin and structure be 

 ing conveniently concealed, interesting thrills and 

 shudders may be had. Civilized man in the nine 

 teenth century outdid these bugaboos in his image 

 of a fixed universe hung on a cast-iron framework 

 of fixed, necessary, and universal laws. Knowl 

 edge of nature does not mean subjection to predes 

 tination, but insight into courses of change; an 

 insight which is formulated in &quot; laws,&quot; that is, 

 methods of subsequent procedure. 



Knowledge of the process and conditions of phys 

 ical and social change through experimental science 

 and genetic history has one result with a double 

 name : increasejaf control, and increase o^responsi- 

 bility ; increase of powerjtojiirect natural^change, 

 and increase of responsibility for its equitable direc 

 tion toward fuller good. Theory located within 

 progressive practice instead of reigning statically 

 supreme over it, means practice itself made respon 

 sible to intelligence; to intelligence which relent 

 lessly scrutinizes the consequences of every prac 

 tice, and which exacts liability by an equally re 

 lentless publicity. As long as morals occupies it 

 self with mere ideals, forces and conditions as they 



