THE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY 81 



ing the knower and feeling the known ? into feeling 

 as being and feeling as acquaintance? Let us 

 frankly deny such monsters. Feeling is its own 



,, -quality; is its own specific (whence and why, once 

 more, subjective?) being. If this statement be 

 dogmatism, it is at least worth insistent declara 

 tion, were it only by way of counter-irritant to that 

 other dogmatism which asserts that being in &quot; con 

 sciousness &quot; is always presence for or in knowledge. 

 So let us repeat once more, that to be a smell (or 

 anything else) is one thing, to be known as smell, 



. another ; to be a &quot; feeling &quot; one thing, to be known 

 as a &quot; feeling &quot; another. 1 The first is thinghood ; 

 existence indubitable, direct; in this way all things 

 are that are in &quot; consciousness &quot; at all. 2 The 

 second is reflected being, things indicating and call 

 ing for other things something offering the possi 

 bility of truth and hence of falsity. The first is 



1 Let us further recall that this theory requires either that 

 things present shall already be psychical things (feelings, 

 sensations, etc.), in order to be assimilated to the knowing 

 mind, subject to consciousness; or else translates genuinely 

 naive realism into the miracle of a mind that gets out 

 side itself to lay its ghostly hands upon the things of an 

 external world. 



2 This means that things may be present as known, just as 

 they be present as hard or soft, agreeable or disgusting, 



hoped for or dreaded. The mediacy, or the art of interven 

 tion, which characterizes knowledge, indicates precisely the 

 way in which known things as known are immediately 

 present, 



