84 THE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY 



But we may also suppose that the blur of the 

 photograph suggests the superimposition of pic 

 tures and something of their character. Then we 

 get another, and for our problem, much more fruit 

 ful kind of persistence. We will imagine that the 

 final G assumes this form: Gratification-terminat- 

 ing-movement-induced-by-smell. The smell is 

 still present; it has persisted. It is not present in 

 its original form, but is represented with a quality, 

 an office, that of having excited activity and thereby 

 terminating its career in a certain quale of grati 

 fication. It is not S, but 2 ; that is S with an 

 increment of meaning due to maintenance and ful 

 filment through a process. S is no longer just 

 smell, but smell which has excited and thereby se 

 cured. 



Here we have a cognitive, but not a cognitional 

 thing. In saying that the smell is finally experi 

 enced as meaning gratification (through interven 

 ing handling, seeing, etc. ) and meaning it not in a 

 hapless way, but in a fashion which operates to 

 effect what is meant, we retrospectively attribute 

 intellectual force and function to the smell and 

 this is what is signified by &quot; cognitive.&quot; Yet the 

 smell is not cognitional, because it did not know 

 ingly intend to mean this ; but is found, after the 

 event, to have meant it. Nor again is the final 

 experience, the 2 or transformed S, a knowledge. 



Here again the statement may be challenged. 



