THE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY 85 



Those who agree with the denial that bare presence 

 of a quale in &quot;consciousness&quot; constitutes acquaint 

 ance and simple apprehension, may now turn 

 against us, saying that experience of fulfilment of 

 meaning is just what we mean by knowledge, and 

 this is just what the 2 of our illustration is. The 

 point is fundamental. As the smell at first was 

 presence or being, less than knowing, so the fulfil 

 ment is an experience that is more than knowing. 

 Seeing and handling the flower, enjoying the full 

 meaning of the smell as the odor of just this 

 beautiful thing, is not knowledge because it is more 

 than knowledge. 



As this may seem dogmatic, let us suppose that 

 the fulfilment, the realization, experience, is a 

 knowledge. Then how shall it be distinguished 

 * from and yet classed with other things called knowl 

 edge, viz., reflective, discursive cognitions? Such 

 knowledges are what they are precisely because they 

 are not fulfilments, but intentions, aims, schemes, 

 symbols of overt fulfilment. Knowledge, perceptual 

 and conceptual, of a hunting dog is prerequisite in 

 order that I may really hunt with the hounds. The 

 hunting in turn may increase my knowledge of dogs 

 and their ways. But the knowledge of the dog, qua 

 knowledge, remains characteristically marked off 

 from the use of that knowledge in the fulfilment 

 experience, the hunt. The hunt is a realization of 

 knowledge; it alone, if you please, verifies, vali- 



