THE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY 89 



all aims (that is, things aimed at) are present in 

 just such fashion. Things can be presented as 

 absent, just as they can be presented as hard or 

 soft, black or white, six inches or fifty rods away 

 from the body. The assumption that an ideal 

 content must be either totally absent, or else 

 present in just the same fashion as it will be 

 when it is realized, is not only dogmatic, but self- 

 contradictory. The only way in which an ideal 

 content can be experienced at all is to be presented 

 as not-present-in-the-same-way in which something 

 else is present, the latter kind of presence afford 

 ing the standard or type of satisfactory presence. 

 When present in the same way it ceases to be an 

 ideal content. Not a contrast of bare existence 

 over against non-existence, or of present conscious 

 ness over against reality out of present conscious 

 ness, but of a satisfactory with an unsatisfactory 

 1 mode of presence makes the difference between the 

 &quot; really &quot; and the &quot; ideally &quot; present. 



In terms of our illustration, handling and en 

 joying the rose are present, but they are not 

 present in the same way that the smell is present. 

 Th?^ are present as going to be there in the 

 same way, through an operation which the smell 

 stands sponsor for. The situation is inherently 

 an uneasy one one in which everything hangs 

 upon the performance of the operation indicated; 

 upon the adequacy of movement as a connecting 



