THE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY 99 



the development of natural knowledge, or the signi 

 fying of one thing by another, there arises the 

 notion of the knowing medium as something rad 

 ically different in the order of existence from the 

 thing to be known. It arises subsequent to the re- 

 - peated experience of non-fulfilment, of frustration 

 and disappointment. The odor did not after all 

 mean the rose ; it meant something quite different ; 

 and yet its indicative function was exercised so 

 forcibly that we could not help or at least did 

 not help believing in the existence of the rose. 

 This is a familiar and typical kind of experience, 

 one which very early leads to the recognition that 

 &quot; things are not what they seem.&quot; There are 

 two contrasted methods of dealing with this recog 

 nition: one is the method indicated above (p. 93). 

 We go more thoroughly, patiently, and carefully 

 into the facts of the case. We employ all sorts 

 of methods, invented for the purpose, of examin 

 ing the things that are signs and the things that 

 are signified, and we experimentally produce vari 

 ous situations, in order that we may tell what smells 

 mean roses when roses are meant, what it is about 

 the smell and the rose that led us into error; and 

 that we may be able to discriminate those cases in 

 which a suspended conclusion is all that circum 

 stances admit. We simply do the best we can to 

 regulate our system of signs so that they become as 

 instructive as possible, utilizing for this purpose 



