THE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY 103 



tion is related to all alike, and hence condemns and 

 justifies all alike. 1 



It is interesting to note that the transcenden- 

 talist almost invariably first falls into the psycho 

 logical fallacy ; and then having himself taken the 

 psychologist s attitude (the attitude which is in 

 terested in meanings as themselves self-inclosed 

 &quot; ideas &quot;) accuses the empiricist whom he criticises 

 of having confused mere psychological existence 

 with logical validity. That is, he begins by sup 

 posing that the smell of our illustration (and all 

 the cognitional objects for which this is used as a 



1 The belief in the metaphysical transcendence of the ob 

 ject of knowledge seems to have its real origin in an 

 empirical transcendence of a very specific and describable 

 sort. The thing meaning is one thing; the thing meant is 



- another thing, and is (as already pointed out) a thing pre 

 sented as not given in the same way as is the thing which 

 means. It is something to be so given. No amount of care 

 ful and thorough inspection of the indicating and signifying 

 things can remove or annihilate this gap. The probability 



t of correct meaning may be increased in varying degrees 

 and this is what we mean by control. But final certi 

 tude can never be reached except experimentally except by 

 performing the operations indicated and discovering whether 

 or no the intended meaning is fulfilled in propria persona. 

 In this experimental sense, truth or the object of any given 

 meaning is always beyond or outside of the cognitional thing 

 that means it. Error as well as truth is a necessary 

 function of knowing. But the non-empirical account of 

 this transcendent (or beyond) relationship puts all the 

 error in one place (our knowledge), and all the truth in 

 another (absolute consciousness or else a thing-in-itself). 



