104 THE EXPERIMENTAL THEORY 



symbol) is a purely mental or psychical state, 

 so that the question of logical reference or inten 

 tion is the problem of how the merely mental can 

 &quot; know &quot; the extra-mental. But from a strictly 

 empirical point of view, the smell which knows is 

 no more merely mental than is the rose known. 

 We may, if we please, say that the smell when 

 involving conscious meaning or intention is &quot; men 

 tal,&quot; but this term &quot; mental &quot; does not denote some 

 separate type of existence existence as a state of 

 consciousness. It denotes only the fact that the 

 smell, a real and non-psychical object, now exer 

 cises an intellectual function. This new property 

 involves, as James has pointed out, an additive 

 relation a new property possessed by a non- 

 mental object, when that object, occurring in 

 a new context, assumes a further office and 

 use. 1 To be &quot; in the mind &quot; means to be in a 

 situation in which the function of intending is 

 directly concerned. 2 Will not some one who be 

 lieves that the knowing experience is ab origine a 

 strictly &quot; mental &quot; thing, explain how, as matter 

 of fact, it does get a specific, extra-mental refer 

 ence, capable of being tested, confirmed, or re- 



1 Compare his essay, &quot; Does Consciousness Exist ? &quot; in 

 the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific 

 Methods, Vol. I., p. 480. 



2 Compare the essay on the &quot;Problem of Consciousness,&quot; 

 by Professor Woodbridge, in the Garman Memorial Volume, 

 entitled &quot; Studies in Philosophy and Psychology.&quot; 



