THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION 

 FOR TRUTH * 



A MONG the influences that have worked in 

 **- contemporary philosophy towards disinte 

 gration of intellectualism of the epistemological 

 type, and towards the substitution of a philosophy 

 of experience, the work of Mr. Bradley must be 

 seriously counted. One has, for example, only to 

 compare his metaphysics with the two fundamental 

 contentions of T. H. Green, namely, that reality 

 is a single, eternal, and all-inclusive system of 

 relations, and that this system of relations is one 

 in kind with that process of relating which consti 

 tutes our thinking, to be instantly aware of a 

 changed atmosphere. Much of Bradley s writings 

 is a sustained and deliberate polemic against in 

 tellectualism of the Neo-Kantian type. When, 

 however, we find conjoined to this criticism an 



1 Reprinted, with many changes, from an article in Mind, 

 Vol. XVI., N.S., July 1907. Although the changes have 

 been made to render the article less technical, it still re 

 mains, I fear, too technical to be intelligible to those not 

 familiar with recent discussions of logical theory. 



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