THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION 115 



ence in some other phase. This latter existence, 

 therefore, is always left out in the cold. It is as 

 if we wanted to get all the cloth in the world into 

 one garment and our only way of accomplishing 

 this were to tear off a portion from one piece of 

 goods in order to patch it on to another. 



The subject of the judgment, moreover, as well 

 as the predicate, stands in the way of judgment 

 fulfilling its own task. It has &quot; sensuous infini 

 tude &quot; and it has &quot; immediacy,&quot; but these two 

 traits contradict each other. The details of the 

 subject always go beyond itself, being indefinitely 

 related to something beyond. &quot; In its given con- 

 , tent it has relations which do not terminate within 

 that content&quot; (ibid., p. 176), while in its imme 

 diacy it presents an undivided union of existence 

 and meaning. No subject can be mere existence 

 any more than it can be mere meaning. It is al 

 ways existent or embodied meaning. As such it 

 claims individuality or the character of a single 

 subsistent whole. But this indispensable claim is 

 inconsistent with its ragged-edged character, its 

 indefinite external reference, which is indispensable 

 to it as subject that it may require and receive 

 further meaning from predication. 



With respect to the copula the following quo 

 tation from the &quot; Principles &quot; of Logic (p. 10) 

 may serve : &quot; Judgment proper is the act which 

 refers the ideal content (recognized as such) to the 



