116 THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION 



reality beyond the act.&quot; In other words, judg 

 ment as act (and it is the act which is expressed 

 in the copula) must always fall outside of 

 the content of knowledge as such; yet since this 

 act certainly falls within reality, it would have to 

 be recognized and stated by any knowledge pre 

 tending to competency with respect to reality as a 

 whole. These considerations, stated in this way, 

 are highly technical and presuppose a knowledge 

 not merely of Mr. Bradley s own logic, but also of 

 the logical analysis of knowledge initiated by Kant 

 and carried on by Herbart, Lotze, and others. 

 Their main import may, however, be stated in 

 comparatively non-technical form. Human ex 

 perience is full of discrepancies. Were experience 

 purely a matter of brute existence (such as we some 

 times imagine the animals experience to be) it 

 would be totally lacking in meaning and there 

 would be no problems, no thinking, no occasion for 

 thinking, and hence no philosophy. On the other 

 hand, if experience were a complete, tight- j ointed 

 union of existence and meaning, there would be 

 no dissatisfaction, no problems, no cause for efforts 

 to patch up defects and contradictions. Existences, 

 things, would embody all the meanings that they 

 suggest; while abstract meanings, values that are 

 merely ideal, that are projected or thought of 

 but not fulfilled, would be totally unheard of. But 

 our experience stands in marked contrast to both 



