118 THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION 



but inherent in its own nature as judgment,) that 

 render it incapable of realizing its aim of complete 

 union of existence and meaning. Granted the 

 argument, and it is difficult to imagine a more 

 serious indictment against the pretensions of phi 

 losophy to reach &quot; Reality &quot; via the exclusive path 

 of knowledge. 



The presence of contradiction is Mr. Bradley s 

 criterion for &quot; appearance,&quot; just as its absence 

 is his criterion for &quot; reality.&quot; It thus goes with 

 out saying that knowledge and truth which we can 

 attain are matters of appearance. Contradiction 

 between existence and meaning is its last word. 

 This is not merely a logical deduction from Mr. 

 Bradley s position, but is expressly stated by him. 

 &quot; Thus the truth belongs to existence, but it does 

 not as such exist. . . . Truth shows a dis 

 section but never an actual life &quot; (&quot; Appearance 

 and Reality,&quot; p. 167). Again, &quot; every truth is 

 appearance since in it we have divorce of quality 

 from being&quot; (ibid., p. 187). &quot;Even absolute 

 truth seems in the end to turn out erroneous. 

 . . . Internal discrepancy belongs irremovably 

 to truth s proper character. . . . Truth is 

 one aspect of experience and is therefore made im 

 perfect and limited by what it fails to include &quot; 

 {ibid. 9 pp. 544-545). Nothing could be more 

 explicit as to the inherently contradictory char 

 acter of truth, both as an ideal and as an accom- 



