THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION 119 



plished fact; nothing more positive as to the un 

 reality or appearance-character of truth. We 

 cannot, on Mr. Bradley s method, stop here. Not 

 only is knowledge working as it does through 

 thought which is always partial, selective, abstrac 

 tive doomed to failure in accomplishing its task, 

 but the existence of the contradiction between the 

 suggestion of meanings by existence and this reali 

 zation in existence is itself due to thought. 



Speaking of thought he says : &quot; The relational 

 form is a compromise on which thought stands and 

 which it develops.&quot; And all the particular anti 

 nomies which he discusses are interpreted as having 

 their basis in the category of relation (ibid., 

 p. 180). In his section on Appearance he goes 

 through various aspects and distinctions of the 

 world, such as primary and secondary qualities, 

 substance and its properties, relation and qualita 

 tive elements, space and time, motion and change, 

 causation, etc., pointing out irreconcilable discrep 

 ancies in them. He does not, in a generalized way, 

 expressly refer them to any common source or root. 

 But it seems a fair inference that the relational 

 character of thought is at the bottom of the whole 

 trouble: so that we have in the cases mentioned 

 precisely the same situation in concrete which 

 is set forth in abstracto in the discussion of 

 thought. The contradictions brought up are in 

 every case resolved into the fundamental discrep- 



