124 THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION 



Upon the ambiguity of a word, the systematic in 

 dictment of intellectualism becomes the corner 

 stone of a systematically intellectualistic method of 

 conceiving reality! 



Mr. Bradley has himself recognized the seeming 

 contradiction between his indictment of thought 

 and his use of the criterion of thought as the ex 

 clusive path to a philosophic notion of the real. 

 In dealing with it, he (to my mind) comes within 

 an ace of stating a truer doctrine, and also ex 

 hibits even more clearly the weakness of his own 

 position. He goes so far as to put the follow 

 ing words into the mouth of an objector, and to 

 accept their general import : &quot; All axioms, as a 

 matter of fact, are practical . . . for none of 

 them in the end can amount to more than the im 

 pulse to behave in a certain way. And they can 

 not express more than this impulse, together with 

 the impossibility of satisfaction unless it is com 

 plied with&quot; (p. 151). After accepting this (p. 

 152) he goes on to say: &quot;Take for example the 

 law of avoiding contradiction. When two elements 

 will not remain quietly together, but collide and 

 struggle, we cannot rest satisfied with that state. 

 Our impulse is to alter it and, on the theoretical 

 side, to bring the content to such shape that the 

 variety remains peaceably in one. And this in 

 ability to rest otherwise and this tendency to alter 

 in a certain way and direction is, when reflected 



