126 THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION 



mode of practice; grant that we are not merely 

 acting (are we ever merely acting?) but are &quot; spe 

 cially occupied and therefore subject to special con 

 ditions,&quot; and the problem remains what special kind 

 of activity is thinking? what is its experienced 

 differentia from other kinds ? what is its commerce 

 with them? When the problem is what special kind 

 of an activity is thinking and of what nature is the 

 consistency which is its criterion, somehow we do 

 not get forward by being told that thinking is a 

 special mode of practice and that its criterion is 

 consistency. The unquestioned presupposition of 

 Mr. Bradley is that thinking is such a wholly sep 

 arate activity (the &quot; intellect alone &quot; which has to 

 be satisfied), that to give it autonomy is to say 

 that it, and its criterion, have nothing to do with 

 other activities ; that it is &quot; independent &quot; as to 

 criterion, in a way which excludes interdependence 

 in function and outcome. Unless the term &quot; spe 

 cial &quot; be interpreted to mean isolated, to say that 

 thinking is a special mode of activity no more nulli 

 fies the proposition that it arises in a practical con 

 test and operates for practical ends, than to say 

 that blacksmithing is a special activity, negates its 

 being one connected mode of industrial activity. 

 His underlying presupposition of the separate 

 character of thought comes out in the passage last 

 quoted. &quot; Our impulse,&quot; he says, &quot; is to alter the 

 conflicting situation and, on the theoretical side, 



