THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION 129 



the criterion of thinking is consistency be employed 

 to determine the nature of the consistency of its 

 object? Consistency in one sense, consistency of 

 reasoning with itself, we know; but what is the 

 nature of the consistency of reality which this con 

 sistency necessitates? Thinking without doubt 

 must be logical; but does it follow from this that 

 the reality about which one thinks, and about which 

 one must think consistently if one is to think to any 

 purpose, must itself be already logical? The pivot 

 of the argument is, of course, the old ontological 

 argument, stripped of all theological irrelevancies 

 and reduced to its fighting weight as a metaphys 

 ical proposition. Those who question this basic 

 principle of intellectualism will, of course, question 

 it here. They will urge that, instead of the con 

 sistency of &quot; reality &quot; resting on the basis of 

 consistency in the reasoning process the latter de 

 rives its meaning from the material consistency at 

 which it aims. They will say that the definition 

 of the nature of the consistency which is the end 

 of thinking and which prescribes its technique is 

 to be reached from inquiry into such questions as 

 these: What sort of an activity in the concrete is 

 thinking? what are the specific conditions which it 

 has to fulfil? what is its use; its relevancy; its 

 purport in present concrete experiences? The 

 more it is insisted that the theoretical standard 

 consistency is final within theory, the more ger- 



