134 THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION 



or as respects some concrete problem, attain 

 greater consistency. Why should the assump 

 tion regarding &quot; reality &quot; be other than that 

 specific realities with which thought is concerned 

 are capable of receiving harmonization? To say 

 that thought must assume, in order to go on, that 

 reality already possesses harmony is to say that 

 thought must begin by contradicting its own direct 

 data, and by assuming that its concrete aim is vain 

 and illusory. Why put upon thought the onus of 

 introducing discrepancies into reality in order just 

 to give itself exercise in the gymnastic of removing 

 them? The assumption that concrete thinking 

 makes about &quot; reality &quot; is that things just as they 

 exist may acquire through activity, guided by 

 thinking, a certain character which it is excellent 

 for them to possess ; and may acquire it more lib 

 erally and effectively than by other methods. 

 One might as well say that the blacksmith could 

 not think to any effect concerning iron, without a 

 Platonic archetypal horseshoe, laid up in the 

 heavens. His thinking also makes an assumption 

 about present, given reality, viz., that this piece 

 of iron, through the exercise of intelligently di 

 rected activity, may be shaped into a satisfactory 

 horseshoe. The assumption is practical: the as 

 sumption that a specific thing may take on in a 

 specific way a specific needed value. The test, 

 moreover, of this assumption is practical; it con- 



