136 THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION 



of this to the function of judgment (as involving 

 namely an explicit statement at once of the actual 

 sundering and the ideal union) and to his account 

 of consistency as the goal and standard, there is 

 still not a detail of the account that is not met 

 amply and with infinitely more empirical warrant 

 by the conception that the &quot; collision &quot; in which 

 thinking starts and the &quot; consistency &quot; in which it 

 terminates are practical and human. 



This brings us explicitly to the question of 

 truth, &quot; truth &quot; being confessedly the end and 

 standard of thinking. I confess to being much 

 at a loss to realize just what the intellectualists 

 conceive to be the relation of truth to ideas on one 

 side and to &quot; reality &quot; on the other. My difficulty 

 occurs, I think, because they describe so little in 

 analytical detail; in writing of truth they seem 

 rather to be under a strong emotional influence 

 as if they were victims of an uncritical pragma 

 tism which leaves much of their thought to be 

 guessed at. The implication of their discussions 

 assigns three distinct values to the term &quot; truth.&quot; 

 On the one hand, truth is something which char 

 acterizes ideas, theories, hypotheses, beliefs, judg 

 ments, propositions, assertions, etc., anything 

 whatsoever involving intellectual statement. From 



