158 THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION 



till better informed, shall I believe it to be clear 

 to any one. 



In his more strictly logical discussions, Mr. 

 Bradley sets out from the notion that truth refers 

 to intellectual statements and positions as such. 

 But the Truth soon becomes a sort of transcen 

 dent essence on its own account. The identifica 

 tion of reality and truth on page 146 may be a 

 mere casual phrase, but the distinction drawn be 

 tween validity and absolute truth (p. 362), and the 

 discussion of Degrees of Truth and Reality, in 

 volve assumptions of an identity of truth and 

 reality. Truth in this sense turns out to be the 

 criterion for the truth, the truth, that is, of ideas. 

 But, again (p. 545), a distinction is made between 

 &quot; Finite Truth,&quot; that is, a view of reality which 

 would completely satisfy intelligence as such, and 

 &quot; Absolute Truth,&quot; which is obtained only by 

 passing beyond intelligence only when intelligence 

 as such is absorbed in some Absolute in which it 

 loses its distinctive character. 



It would advance the state of discussion, I am 

 sure, if there were more explicit statements regard 

 ing the relations of &quot; true idea,&quot; &quot; truth,&quot; &quot; the 

 criterion of truth &quot; and &quot; reality,&quot; to one an 

 other. A more explicit exposition also of the view 

 that is held concerning the relation of verification 

 and truth could hardly fail to be of value. .Not 

 infrequently the intellectualist admits that the 



