144 THE INTELLECTUALIST CRITERION 



was true all the time, is to lose sight of what makes 

 an idea an idea, its hypothetical character; and 

 thereby deliberately to transform it into brute 

 dogma something to which no canon of verifica 

 tion can ever be applied. The intellectualist al 

 most always treats the pragmatic account as if it 

 were, from the standpoint of the pragmatist as well 

 as from his own, a denial of the existence of truth, 

 while it is nothing but a statement of its nature. 

 When the intellectualist realizes this, he will, I hope, 

 ask himself : What, then, on the pragmatic basis is 

 meant by the proposition that an idea is true all 

 the time? If the statement that an idea was true 

 all the time has no meaning except that the idea 

 was one which as matter of fact succeeded through 

 action in achieving its intent, mere reiteration that 

 the idea was true all the time or it could not have 

 succeeded, does not take us far. 1 



1 Such a statement as, for example, Mr. Bradley s (Mind, 

 Vol. XIII., No. 51, N.S., p. 3, article on &quot;Truth and 

 Practice &quot;) &quot; The idea works . . . but is able to work 

 because I have chosen the right idea&quot; surely loses any 

 argumentative force it may seem to have, when it is recalled 

 that, upon the theory argued against, ability to work and 

 Tightness are one and the same thing. If the wording is 

 changed to read &quot;The idea is able to work because I have 

 chosen an idea which is able to work&quot; the question- 

 begging character of the implied criticism is evident. The 

 change of phraseology also may suggest the crucial and 

 pregnant question: How does any one know that an idea 

 is able to work excepting by setting it at work? 



