A CATECHISM CONCERNING TRUTH 155 



knows that the truth of ideas depends upon their 

 relation to things. 



Teacher: Reply. If I were to reply that I 

 hold to existences independent of ideas, existences 

 prior to, synchronous with, and subsequent to ideas, 

 that might seem to you to express only my personal 

 opinion and to have no logical connection with 

 pragmatism. So I beg to remind you that, ac-v 

 cording to pragmatism, ideas (judgments and 

 reasonings being included for convenience in this 

 term) are attitudes of response taken toward ex 

 tra-ideal, extra-mental things. Instinct and habit * 

 express, for instance, modes of response, but modes 

 inadequate for a progressive being, or for adapta 

 tion to an environment presenting novel and un- 

 mastered features. Under such conditions, ideas 

 are their surrogates. The origin of an idea is thus 

 in some empirical, extra-mental situation which 

 provokes ideas as modes of response, while their 

 meaning is found in the modifications the &quot; differ 

 ences &quot; they make in this extra-mental situation. 

 Their validity is in turn measured by their capac 

 ity to effect the transformation they intend. 

 Origin, content, and value all alike are extra- 

 ideational. The satisfaction upon which the 

 pragmatist dwells is just the better adjustment of 

 living beings to their environment effected by 

 transformations of the environment through form 

 ing and applying ideas. 



