A CATECHISM CONCERNING TRUTH 161 



judgment is true. If perchance the past event 

 had no discoverable consequences or our thought of 

 it can work out to no assignable difference any 

 where, then there is no possibility of genuine judg 

 ment. 



Pupil. You have, perhaps, anticipated my next 

 objection, which was that upon the pragmatic 

 theory (by which truth is constituted by future 

 consequences) there are no truths about what is 

 past and gone, since in respect to that ideas can 

 make no difference. For, I suppose, you would 

 say that the difference made is in the effects that 

 continue, since ideas may work out to facilitate or 

 to confuse our relations to these effects. Never 

 theless, I am not quite satisfied. For when I say 

 it is true that it rained yesterday, surely the 

 object of my judgment is something past, not 

 future, while pragmatism makes all objects of 

 judgment future. 



Teacher: Reply. You confuse the content of 

 a judgment with the reference of that content. 

 The content of any idea about yesterday s rain 

 certainly involves past time, but the distinctive 

 or characteristic aim of judgment is none the 

 less to give this content a future reference and 

 function. 



Pupil: Objection Five. But your argument re 

 quires an absurd identification of truth and veri 

 fication. To verify ideas is to find out that they 



