174 BELIEFS AND EXISTENCES 



contrary, the assertion of the absolute &quot; Reality &quot; 

 of what is empirically unrealizable is a part of the 

 scheme; the ideal of a universe of pure, cogni- 

 tional objects, fixed elements in fixed relations. 

 Sensationalist and idealist, positivist and trans- 

 cendentalist, materialist and spiritualist, defining 

 this object in as many differing ways as they have 

 different conceptions of the ideal and method of 

 knowledge, are at one in their devotion to an iden 

 tification of Reality with something that connects 

 monopolistically with passionless knowledge, belief 

 purged of all personal reference, origin, and out 

 look. 1 



What is to be said of this attempt to sever the 

 cord which naturally binds together personal atti 

 tudes and the meaning of things? This much at 

 least : the effort to extract meanings, values, from 

 the beliefs that ascribe them, and to give the 

 former absolute metaphysical validity while the 

 latter are sent to wander as scapegoats in the wil- 



1 Hegel may be excepted from this statement. The habit 

 of interpreting Hegel as a Neo-Kantian, a Kantian en 

 larged and purified, is a purely Anglo-American habit. 

 This is no place to enter into the intricacies of Hegelian 

 exegesis, but the subordination of both logical meaning and 

 of mechanical existence to Oeist } to life in its own develop 

 ing movement, would seem to stand out in any unbiased 

 view of Hegel. At all events, I wish to recognize my own 

 personal debt to Hegel for the view set forth in this paper, 

 without, of course, implying that it represents Hegel s own 

 intention. 



