BELIEFS AND EXISTENCES 193 



derstandings. And, to begin with, while possible 

 doubts inevitably troop with actual beliefs, the doc 

 trine in question is not particularly sceptical. The 

 radical empiricist, the humanist, the pragmatist, 

 label him as you will, believes not in fewer but in 

 more &quot; realities &quot; than the orthodox philosophers 

 warrant. He is not concerned, for example, in 

 discrediting objective realities and logical or uni 

 versal thinking; he is interested in such a reinter- 

 pretation of the sort of &quot; reality &quot; which these 

 things possess as will accredit, without deprecia 

 tion, concrete empirical conscious centers of action 

 and passion. 



My second remark is to the opposite effect. The 

 intent is not especially credulous, although it starts 

 from and ends with the radical credulity of all 

 knowledge. To suppose that because the sciences 

 are ultimately instrumental to human beliefs, we 

 are therefore to be careless of the most exact possi 

 ble use of extensive and systematic scientific 

 methods, is like supposing that because a watch is 

 made to tell present time, and not to be an exem 

 plar of transcendent, absolute time, watches might 

 as well be made of cheap stuffs, casually wrought 

 and clumsily put together. It is the task of telling 

 present time, with all its urgent implications, that 

 brings home, steadies, and enlarges the responsi 

 bility for the best possible use of intelligence, the 

 instrument. 



