206 EXPERIENCE AND IDEALISM 



II 



I begin the discussion with the last-named func 

 tion. Thought is here conceived as a priori, not 

 in the sense of particular innate ideas, but of a 

 function that constitutes the very possibility of, 

 any objective experience, any experience involving 

 reference beyond its own mere subjective happen 

 ing. I shall try to show that idealism is con 

 demned to move back and forth between two in 

 consistent interpretations of this a priori thought. 

 It is taken to mean both the organized, the regu 

 lated, the informed, established character of ex 

 perience, an order immanent and constitutional; 

 and an agency which organizes, regulates, forms* 

 synthesizes, a power operative and constructive. 

 And the oscillation between and confusion of these 

 two diverse senses is necessary to Neo-Kantian 

 idealism. 



When Kant compared his work in philosophy to 

 that of the men who introduced construction into 

 geometry, and experimentation into physics and 

 chemistry, the point of his remarks depends upon 

 taking the a priori worth of thought in a regula 

 tive, directive, controlling sense, thought as con-~ 

 sciously, intentionally, making an experience differ 

 ent in a determinate sense and manner. But the 

 point of his answer to Hume consists in taking the 

 a priori in the other sense, as something which 



