EXPERIENCE AND IDEALISM 211 



what Kantian forms and schematizations do only 

 supernaturally. In a word, the constructive or 

 organizing activity of &quot; thought &quot; does not inhere 

 in thought as a transcendental function, a form or 

 mode of some supra-empirical ego, mind, or con 

 sciousness, but in thought as itself vital activity. 

 And in any case we have passed to the idea of 

 thought as reflectively reconstructive and direc 

 tive, and away from the notion of thought as 

 immanently constitutional and organizational. 

 To make this passage and yet to ignore its 

 existence and import is essential to objective 

 idealism. 



(2) No final or ultimate validity attaches to 

 these original arrangements and institutionaliza- 

 tions in any case. Their value is teleological and 

 experimental, not fixedly ontological. &quot; Law and 

 order &quot; are good things, but not when they become 

 rigidity, and create mechanical uniformity or rou 

 tine. Prejudice is the acme of the a priori. Of 

 the a priori in this sense we may say what is always 

 to be said of habits and institutions : They are good 

 servants, but harsh and futile masters. Organi 

 zation as already effected is always in danger of 

 becoming a mortmain; it may be a way of sacri 

 ficing novelty, flexibility, freedom, creation to 

 static standards. The curious inefficiency of ideal 

 ism at this point is evident in the fact that genuine 

 thought, empirical reflective thought, is required 



