EXPERIENCE AND IDEALISM 213 



value and energy, are embodied in our objective 

 institutional classifications. As a special favor, 

 will not the objective idealist show how, in some 

 one single instance, his immanent &quot; reason &quot; makes 

 any difference as respects the detection and elimi 

 nation of error, or gives even the slightest assist 

 ance in discovering and validating the truly worth- 

 ful? This practical work, the life blood of in 

 telligence in everyday life and in critical science, is 

 done by the despised and rejected matter of con-~ 

 crete empirical contexts and functions. General 

 izing the issue: If the immanent organization be 

 ascribed to thought, why should its work be such 

 as to demand continuous correction and revision? 

 If specific reflective thought, as empirical, be sub 

 ject to all the limitations supposed to inhere in 

 experience as such, how can it assume the burden 

 of making good, of supplementing, reconstruct 

 ing, and developing meanings? The logic of the 

 case seems to be that Neo-Kantian idealism gets 

 its status against empiricism by first accepting 

 the Humian idea of experience, while the express 

 import of its positive contribution is to show the 

 non-existence (not merely the cognitive invalidity) 

 of anything describable as mere states of subjective 

 consciousness. Thus in the end it tends to destroy 

 itself and to make way for a more adequate em 

 piricism. 



