214 EXPERIENCE AND IDEALISM 



III 



In the above discussion, I have unavoidably an 

 ticipated the second problem: the relation of con 

 ceptual thought to perceptual data. A distinct 

 aspect still remains, however. Perception, as well 

 as apriority, is a term harboring a fundamental 

 ambiguity. It may mean (1) a distinct type of 

 activity, predominantly practical in character, 

 though carrying at its heart important cognitive 

 and esthetic qualities; or () a distinctively cog- 

 nitional experience, the function of observation as 

 explicitly logical a factor in science qua science. 



In the first sense, as recent functional empiricism 

 (working in harmony with psychology, but not 

 itself peculiarly psychological) has abundantly 

 shown, perception is primarily an act of adjust 

 ment of organism and environment, differing from 

 a mere reflex or instinctive adaptation in that, in 

 order to compensate for the failure of the instinc 

 tive adjustment, it requires an objective or dis 

 criminative presentation of conditions of action: 

 the negative conditions or obstacles, and the posi 

 tive conditions or means and resources. 1 This, of 



1 Compare, for example, Dr. Stuart s paper in the &quot; Studies 

 in Logical Theory,&quot; pp. 253-256. I may here remark that I 

 remain totally unable to see how the interpretation of ob 

 jectivity to mean controlling conditions of action (nega 

 tive and positive as above) derogates at all from its naive 



