EXPERIENCE AND IDEALISM 217 



periences. But in so far as thought is identified 

 with the conceptual phase as such of the entire . 

 logical function, observation is, of course, set over 

 against thought: deliberately, purposely, and art 

 fully so. 



It is not uncommon to hear it said that the 

 Lockeian movement was all well enough for psy 

 chology, but went astray because it invaded the 

 field of logic. If we mean by psychology a natu 

 ral history of what at any time passes for knowl 

 edge, and by logic conscious control in the direc 

 tion of grounded assurance, this remark appears 

 to reverse the truth. As a natural history of 

 knowledge in the sense of opinion and belief, 

 Locke s account of discrete, simple ideas or mean 

 ings, which are compounded and then distributed, 

 does palpable violence to the facts. But every 

 line of Locke shows that he was interested in knowl 

 edge in its honorific sense controlled certainty, 

 or, where this is not feasible, measured probability. 

 And to logic as an account of the way in which 

 we by art build up a tested assurance, a rational 

 ized conviction, Locke makes an important positive 

 contribution. The pity is that he inclined to 

 take it for the whole of the logic of science, 1 not 

 seeing that it was but a correlative division of 



1 This, however, is not strictly true, since Locke goes far to 

 supply the means of his own correction in his account of the 

 &quot; workmanship of the understanding.&quot; 



