228 THE POSTULATE OF EMPIRICISM 



In each case, the nub of the question is, what 

 sort of experience is denoted or indicated: a con 

 crete and determinate experience, varying, when it 

 varies, in specific real elements, and agreeing, when 

 it agrees, in specific real elements, so that we have 

 a contrast, not between a Reality, and various 

 approximations to, or phenomenal representations 

 of Reality, but between different reals of experi 

 ence. Arid the reader is begged to bear in mind 

 that from this standpoint, when &quot; an experience &quot; 

 or &quot; some sort of experience &quot; is referred to, &quot; some 

 thing &quot; or &quot; some sort of thing &quot; is always 

 meant. 



Now, this statement that things are what they 

 are experienced to be is usually translated into 

 the statement that things (or, ultimately, Reality, 

 Being) are only and just what they are known to 

 be or that things are, or Reality is, what it is for 

 a conscious knower ^whether the knower be con 

 ceived primarily as a perceiver or as a thinker be 

 ing a further, and secondary, question. This is 

 the root-paralogism of all idealisms, whether sub 

 jective or objective, psychological or epistemolog- 

 ical. By our postulate, things are what they are 

 experienced to be ; and, unless knowing is the sole 

 and only genuine mode of experiencing, it is falla 

 cious to say that Reality is just and exclusively 

 what it is or would be to an all-competent all- 

 knower; or even that it is, relatively and piece- 



