THE POSTULATE OF EMPIRICISM 241 



Woodbridge), raised a point of fact, holding that cogni- 

 tional experience tells us, without alteration, just what the 

 things of other types of experience are, and in that sense 

 transcends other experiences. This is too fundamental an 

 issue to discuss in a note, and I content myself with re 

 marking that with respect to it, the bearing of the article 

 is that the issue must be settled by a careful descriptive 

 survey of things as experienced, to see whether modifica 

 tions do not occur in existences when they are experienced as 

 known; i.e., as true or false in character. The reader 

 interested in following up this discussion is referred to 

 the following articles: Vol. II. of the Journal of Philosophy, 

 Psychology, and Scientific Methods, two articles by Bake- 

 well, p. 520 and p. 687; one by Bode, p. 658; one by Wood- 

 bridge, p. 573; Vol. III. of the same Journal, by Leighton, 

 p. 174.] 



