CONSCIOUSNESS AND EXPERIENCE 247 



But, be the reasons as they may, there is little 

 doubt of the fact. Almost all our working psy 

 chologists admit, nay, herald this limitation of 

 their work. I am not presumptuous enough to 

 set myself against this array. I too proclaim 

 myself of those who believe that psychology has to 

 do (at a certain point, that is) with &quot; conscious 

 ness as such.&quot; But I do not believe that the limi 

 tation is final. Quite the contrary : if &quot; conscious 

 ness &quot; or &quot; state of consciousness &quot; be given in 

 telligible meaning, I believe that this conception is 

 the open gateway into the fair fields of philosophy. 

 For, note you, the phrase is an ambiguous one. It 

 may mean one thing to the metaphysician who 

 proclaims : Here finally we have psychology rec 

 ognizing her due metes and bounds, giving bonds 

 to trespass no more. It may mean quite another 

 thing to the psychologist in his work whatever 

 he may happen to say about it. It may be that 

 the psychologist deals with states of consciousness 

 as the significant, the analyzable and describable 

 form, to which he reduces the things he is study 

 ing. Not that they are that existence, but that 

 they are its indications, its clues, in shape for 

 handling by scientific methods. So, for example, 

 does the paleontologist work. Those curiously 

 shaped and marked forms to which he is devoted 

 are not life, nor are they the literal termini of his 

 endeavor; but through them as signs and records 



