CONSCIOUSNESS AND EXPERIENCE 251 



sight in the course of discussion, it is only because 

 having been taken for granted, they remain to 

 control the whole development of the inquiry, and 

 to afford the sterling medium of redemption. Acts 

 such as perceiving, remembering, intending, lov 

 ing give the points of departure; they alone are 

 concrete experiences. To understand these ex 

 periences, under what conditions they arise, and 

 what effects they produce, analysis into states of 

 consciousness occurs. And the modes of conscious 

 ness that are figured remain unarranged and un 

 important, save as they may be translated back 

 into acts. 



To remember is to do something, as much as 

 to shoe a horse, or to cherish a keepsake. To pro 

 pose, to observe, to be kindly affectioned, are terms 

 of value, of practice, of operation; just as diges 

 tion, respiration, locomotion express functions, not 

 observable &quot; objects.&quot; But there is an object 

 that may be described: lungs, stomach, leg-mus 

 cles, or whatever. Through the structure we pre 

 sent to ourselves the function ; it appears laid out 

 before us, spread forth in detail objectified in a 

 word. The anatomist who devotes himself to this 

 detail may, if he please (and he probably does 

 please to concentrate his devotion) ignore the 

 function : to discover what is there, to analyze, to 

 measure, to describe, gives him outlet enough. 

 But nevertheless it is the function that fixed the 



