CONSCIOUSNESS AND EXPERIENCE 258 



Explanation, even of an &quot; empirical sort &quot; is as 

 impossible as determination of a &quot; state &quot; and its 

 classification, when we rigidly confine ourselves to 

 modifications of consciousness as a self-existent. 

 Sensations are always defined, classified, and ex 

 plained by reference to conditions which, according 

 to the theory, are extraneous sense-organs and 

 stimuli. The whole physiological side assumes a 

 ludicrously anomalous aspect on this basis. 1 

 While experimentation is retained, and even made 

 much of, it is at the cost of logical coherence. To 

 experiment with reference to a bare state of con 

 sciousness is a performance of which one cannot 

 imagine the nature, to say nothing of doing it; 

 while to experiment with reference to acts and the 

 conditions of their occurrence is a natural and 

 straightforward undertaking. Such simple proc 

 esses as association are concretely inexplicable when 



these are reached by scientific abstraction in order to ac 

 count for complex forms. From which it would appear 

 that they are hypothecated as products of interpretation 

 and for purposes of further interpretation. Only the delu- 

 pion that the more complex forms are just aggregates (in 

 stead of being acts, like seeing, hoping, etc.) prevents 

 recognition of the point in question that the &quot;state of 

 consciousness&quot; is an instrument of inquiry or method 

 ological appliance. 



1 On the other hand, if what we are trying to get at is 

 just the course and procedure of experiencing, of course 

 any consideration that helps distinguish and make com 

 prehensible that process is thoroughly pertinent. 



